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A great range of firms across diverse industries use knowledge workers such as IT personnel, managers, and
lawyers. Firms sometimes hire them internally and sometimes outsource their services. How do they choose one
versus the other?
In my job market paper, I answer this question using US federal lobbying data. The data are particularly suitable for
answering this question because, contrary to previous studies that contain information only on outsourced activities,
the lobbying data have detailed information on which activities are conducted inside the firm and which activities are
outsourced.
In-house vs external lobbyists
I propose a model in which two key differences between in-house and external lobbyists emerge in equilibrium.
Internal staff specialize in the firm’s industry — that is, they are familiar with its culture, its internal practices, etc.
External staff have scarce knowledge of the firm’s industry, but they are experts on the topics on which they work.
The use of an in-house lobbyist provides knowledge of the industry at the expense of paying compensation
proportional to the skills that the lobbyist has acquired. I call this payment the cost of acquiring skills. This cost is
proportional to how easy it is for lobbyists to access the information to conduct their work. When it is easy to access
this information, then it is less costly to have someone in-house. For lobbyists, the information they need to perform
their job includes knowing which firms are interested in which bills, which lobbyists are working for which interest
groups, what other firms are interested in and so on.
If the firm hires an external lobbyist, it has access to a higher skill level than the in-house lobbyist provides. External
lobbyists achieve these skill levels because they can leverage the acquisition of skills across several clients, while
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in-house lobbyists acquire fewer skills because they work for only one client.  Despite their superior skills, the
drawback of hiring external lobbyists is that they do not know what happens in the firm’s industry as well as in-house
lobbyists do. Thus, when the firm hires an external lobbyist, it has to pay a cost to communicate the culture or the
internal practices of its industry. I call this the communication cost.
Therefore, the main trade-off that the firm faces in choosing in-house versus external staff is between these two
costs: the cost of acquiring the skills for the in-house lobbyist or the cost of communicating the culture of its industry
to the external lobbyist.
I show theoretically that firms use in-house lobbyists when they need to solve tasks that occur very frequently or that
have low skill requirements. If the tasks are not that frequent or have high skill requirements, the firms outsource.
Finally, if the culture of the industry is too expensive to communicate, firms are more likely to use in-house rather
than external lobbyists.
Empirical exercises
To confirm the empirical validity of the theoretical framework, I conduct several empirical exercises. I first show
some correlations using firms and time fixed effects estimations. Here I provide only two examples.
I measure skill requirements of lobbyists’ activities using information on the witnesses interviewed in Congressional
hearings. In the US Congress, bills are introduced and sent to committees, where they are studied in hearings. In
these hearings, Congressmen invite witnesses with experience or expertise in the subject to testify. I obtain each
witness’ occupation and classify it as either high- or low-skill.
For example, a witness with a Ph.D., a professor, or someone high up in the hierarchy of a large firm (CEO, Senior
advisor) is classified as a high-skill witness. Then, I show that firms use external rather than internal lobbyists when
they lobby for bills that are studied in committees with a larger fraction of high-skill witnesses. Although the
classification of high and low skills is supported by external measures such as O*NET measures, I show that the
results are robust to different ways of defining high-skill occupations.
A second correlation exercise seeks to understand the relationship between the use of in-house lobbyists and
communication costs. As mentioned, when firms outsource, they spend time explaining the culture and the internal
workings and restrictions of the industry to external lobbyists.  One measure of how lengthy or costly that process
can be is the extent of regulation in that industry: industries with more regulation will take more time to explain. I
use RegData, which provides estimates of the extent of regulation at the industry level. Then, confirming the main
prediction about the relationship between communication costs and the integration decision, I show that firms
belonging to industries with more regulation use in-house rather than external lobbyists.
Although these exercises provide a first step toward validating the theory, they do not use exogenous variation to
determine the extent to which the predictions of the model are valid. Therefore, my next step is to use quasi-
experiments to test two main theoretical predictions. First, firms use more external lobbyists when facing more skill-
intensive activities. Second, firms are more prone to use in-house lobbyists when the cost of acquiring skills
decreases.
BP Oil Spill
I test these predictions using two different events. First, the BP oil spill of 2010 changed the type of problems that
companies in the oil and gas extracting industry were facing. Before the event, these firms lobbied mainly for bills to
improve their funding opportunities. They applied for grants, tax cuts, subsidies and so on. After the spill, although
they continued to lobby for these benefits, they started facing more-technical bills. These new types of bills studied
changes in safeguard requirements and technological investments to avoid another oil spill. Thus, the type of
problems that the affected firms faced became more skill-intensive. Confirming the prediction of my model, I show
that firms in the oil and gas extracting industry used external lobbyists more heavily after the oil spill.
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The Open Government Act
The second event I use is the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (henceforth OGA), which amended
some parts of the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995. It brought about several reforms to increase transparency in the
lobbying industry, and one of those changes involved the cost of acquiring relevant information to conduct lobbying
activities.
Related to this cost, there were two important amendments. First, lobbyists must file reports about their activities
electronically. Before the Act, they could choose between filing the reports electronically or by hand. Second, and
more importantly, the lobbying reports were put online in a public, searchable database soon after the reports were
filed. Thus, as it became cheaper to access information about other lobbyists’ activities, the cost of acquiring skills to
conduct advocacy activities decreased. Next, I empirically show that firms started using in-house lobbyists more
frequently after the Act took effect.
Conclusions
All of the results in this paper are based on a simple and insightful economic force: increasing returns to the use
of skills. This force has been present in economic debates at least since Adam Smith, but research has largely
ignored its relevance to study the problem of the integration decision in a skill-intensive context.
Aside from the current lobbying industry application, my paper underscores the relevance of studying alternative
forces to understand the integration decision. Given how little we know about the workings of this force on the
integration decision and how this force can interact with incentive-alignment issues, the mechanisms and patterns
presented in my Job Market paper are the first step toward better understanding the vertical integration decision
from a different angle.
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